Civil War Book Review
Fall 2014

Article 18

The River Was Dyed With Blood
John David Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr

Recommended Citation
Smith, John David (2014) "The River Was Dyed With Blood," Civil War Book Review: Vol. 16 : Iss. 4 .
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.16.4.19
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol16/iss4/18

Smith: The River Was Dyed With Blood

Review
Smith, John David
Fall 2014

Wills, Brian Steel The River Was Dyed With Blood. University of Oklahoma
Press, $29.95 ISBN 9780806144535
The Culpability of Nathan Bedford Forrest at Fort Pillow
In A Battle from the Start: The Life of Nathan Bedford Forrest (1992), a
work that many consider the best biography of the slave trader turned “wizard of
the saddle" turned Klansman, Brian Steel Wills summarized his interpretation of
the Rebel attack on Fort Pillow, Tennessee, on April 12, 1864: “For a variety of
reasons, Fort Pillow became a collective release of pent-up anger and hatred. It
became, in clinical terms, a group catharsis. And as the overall commander of
the troops on the scene, some of whom carried out these acts, Nathan Bedford
Forrest was responsible" (A Battle from the Start, p. 196). Twenty-two years
later, responding to an unnamed “subsequent author" who alleged that Wills
remained uncertain “about the general’s culpability in the massacre," he decided
to revisit the topic (p. xii). The present volume both narrows Wills’ focus and
interprets the Fort Pillow massacre more broadly than in his earlier work within
the scholarship on race, war, politics, and memory.
Unquestionably, Wills strives for objectivity and balance in assessing the
much-traversed Fort Pillow massacre and the military operations of the man
General Ulysses S. Grant dubbed “that devil Forrest." Fort Pillow has been the
subject of monographs by Richard L. Fuchs (1994), John Cimprich (2005) (a
book that Wills inexplicably omits from his sources), Andrew Ward (2005), and
important articles by Albert Castel (1958), Ronald K. Huch (1973), Cimprich
and Robert C. Mainfort Jr. (1982, 1985, 1989), Court Carney (2001), and Fergus
M. Bordewich (2014).
In The River Was Dyed with Blood: Nathan Bedford Forrest and Fort
Pillow Wills essentially harkens back to his earlier evaluation of Forrest, neither
exculpating him for responsibility for the brutal murder of surrendering Union
troops at Fort Pillow or blaming him. Instead Wills “holds the Southern
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commander accountable for events that moved beyond his control—an offense
that would have disturbed Forrest more fully than anyone else" (p. xi). In other
words, Wills considers Forrest “neither evil incarnate . . . nor somehow innocent
of excesses that happened within his command" (p. 4).
In nine well-written chapters Wills interprets Forrest as an enigmatic figure
who lived at a complex and transitional period in American military history, a
period when demands for “no quarter" and “retribution" increasingly became
part of modern war. “The fact that the Union and the Confederacy were
experiencing these transition also blurred the lines along which critiques could
be made of what or was not acceptable [in battle], especially by those who still
clung to the comforts of the old, familiar structure" (p. 208). In fact, Wills credits
Forrest with possessing “a finely tuned sense of what should or should not
happen in war, all of his bluff, bluster, and intimidation to the contrary. There
was right and wrong. He felt clearly that he . . . recognized and understood the
difference and adhered to the proper side of the line" (p. 67).
Wills also credits Forrest with consistently demonstrating two traits: “his
common-sense approach to warfare and his dogged determination to see an
engagement to a successful conclusion" (p. 309). Wills praises Forrest as a
brilliant and effective cavalry commander who ingeniously fanned his forces
across an area, thereby maximizing results and magnifying his force’s presence.
He convinced the enemy “that he was again everywhere at the same time" (p.
88).
Assessing Forrest and Fort Pillow, Wills maintains that the general may
have won the battle but lost the war of public opinion and he remained defensive
about it for the rest of his life. Forrest “seemed not to have ever understood
precisely why that was the case, but he was well aware of it, and he troubled
himself enormously to counteract these negative assessments both during and
after the war" (p. 162). Forrest repeatedly denied that he had ordered his men to
treat the black troops, Tennessee Unionists, and civilians at Fort Pillow savagely.
He professed to have no intention to annihilate black soldiers and insisted that he
treated all who surrendered humanely and sought to preserve and protect them.
“If such a viewpoint contained self-serving delusion or exaggeration," Wills
explains, “it also reflected the paternalistic framework in which Bedford Forrest
lived and operated" (p. 168).
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In The River Was Dyed with Blood Wills goes to great lengths to view
Forrest’s role at Fort Pillow from the general’s perspective, not from the vantage
point of biased contemporaries or modern historians. Forrest “was obviously no
saint," he insists, “but his commonsense approach and the priorities of a
battlefield offered no imperative for mass murder. Defeating former slaves
would be sufficient to demonstrate their inferiority. To the man who made his
living in the slave trade, such recaptured individuals would be better returned to
their masters. . . . Furthermore, ongoing military operations should not be
compromised by expending valuable time on sadistic practices when there were
enough practical matters left to be accomplished" (p. 156).
Insisting that in his present book not be judged “‘Confederist’ apology,"
Wills notes that Forrest genuinely hoped to negotiate Fort Pillow’s surrender
with its commander in order to avoid the bloodshed resulting from a final
assault. In doing so Forrest exhibited “a tone that was uncharacteristically
conservative and laudatory" (pp. 154, 98). Trying to explain the charred remains
of Union troops following the battle, Wills writes, “There were ample
opportunities for bodies to be burned in whole or in part through the legitimate
activities of war. . . . Others may have been the victims of carelessness or
indifference" (pp. 155-56). Wills also places the Fort Pillow massacre in broad
context, repeatedly citing comparative massacres during the American
Revolution, the Texas Revolution, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and in later
American wars. He observes “that when tactical disintegration occurs, the
opportunities for excess accelerate." In each comparative case “Vicious personal
combat and the chaos and confusion defined the fighting as resistance ebbed and
flowed and combatants exhibited every form of reaction to the events unfolding
around them" (p. 108).
Wills attributes the Fort Pillow massacre to Forrest’s physical distance from
his command during the battle (he stayed in the rear during the assault) and then
his preoccupation after the garrison fell with the Federal gunboat New Era on the
Mississippi River. These, he explains, created a “vacuum of authority" allowing
individuals “to seek their own opportunities for retribution on any enemy they
despised. Forrest, by virtue of his own circumstances, became powerless to stop
them for a time, even if he had wished to do so" (p. 215). “The chaotic nature of
[the Federal troops] retreat and resistance, and the disintegration that occurred as
the defense broke down, blurred the distinction between a battle that had ended
and one that was continuing on an ad-hoc basis" (p. 216).
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In the end, Wills condemns the unnecessary deaths at Fort Pillow and insists
that contextualizing the engagement “is not the same as condoning those actions
or asserting apologetic explanations or defenses for them. Bedford Forrest was
not innocent of the blood shed at Fort Pillow any more than he was responsible
for designing or executing a deliberate massacre there" (p. 216).
Notwithstanding Wills’ contextualization and interpretation of the atrocities
committed by Confederates at Fort Pillow, The River Was Dyed with Blood adds
to but in no way seriously revises his earlier interpretation. Forrest remains
culpable for failing to retain control over his command, whether or not the
massacre was deliberate or the result of “the chaos, heat of battle, and
accompanying racial and sectional hostility" (p. 216).
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